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Individuals with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) display diverse deficits in social,
cognitive and behavioral functioning. To date, there has been mixed findings on the
profile of executive function deficits for high-functioning adults (IQ > 70) with ASD. A
conceptual distinction is commonly made between “cold” and “hot” executive functions.
Cold executive functions refer to mechanistic higher-order cognitive operations (e.g.,
working memory), whereas hot executive functions entail cognitive abilities supported
by emotional awareness and social perception (e.g., social cognition). This study aimed
to determine the independence of deficits in hot and cold executive functions for
high-functioning adults with ASD. Forty-two adults with ASD (64% male, aged 18–66
years) and 40 age and gender matched controls were administered The Awareness of
Social Inference Test (TASIT; emotion recognition and social inference), Letter Number
Sequencing (workingmemory) and Hayling Sentence Completion Test (response initiation
and suppression). Between-group analyses identified that the ASD group performed
significantly worse than matched controls on all measures of cold and hot executive
functions (d = 0.54 − 1.5). Hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed that the
ASD sample performed more poorly on emotion recognition and social inference tasks
than matched controls after controlling for cold executive functions and employment
status. The findings also indicated that the ability to recognize emotions and make social
inferences was supported by working memory and response initiation and suppression
processes. Overall, this study supports the distinction between hot and cold executive
function impairments for adults with ASD. Moreover, it advances understanding of
higher-order impairments underlying social interaction difficulties for this population
which, in turn, may assist with diagnosis and inform intervention programs.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, adults, executive functions, social cognition, neuropsychological
assessment
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INTRODUCTION
Neurophysiological differences between adults with autism
spectrum disorder (ASD) and neurotypical individuals have been
well documented (Bauman, 1996; Bauman and Kemper, 2005).
Anatomical and functional abnormalities have been identified
in the pre-frontal cortex, temporal poles, basal ganglia, and
the limbic system, a network of structures underlying executive
functions and social cognition (Bauman, 1996; McAlonan et al.,
2005; Ashwin et al., 2007; Lieberman, 2007). Yet, there are mixed
empirical findings on the profile of executive function deficits
experienced by high-functioning adults with ASD, or those with
an IQ in the normal range (Boucher et al., 2005; Rajendran
et al., 2005; Hill and Bird, 2006; Baez et al., 2012). In particular,
it is unclear to what extent social cognition deficits overlap
with, or are independent of other executive function deficits.
An improved understanding of the higher-order impairments
that underlie functional difficulties for individuals with ASDmay
assist with diagnosis and inform targeted intervention programs.
Described as an umbrella term, executive functions
encompass higher-order cognitive processes and behavioral
competencies such as planning, cognitive flexibility, social
cognition (e.g., empathy and theory of mind [ToM]) and
emotion regulation (Chan et al., 2008). These higher-order
cognitive functions are mediated by the pre-frontal cortex and
provide control and direction to lower-order brain functions
(Stuss and Levine, 2002). In the literature, a distinction is
commonly made between “cold” and “hot” executive functions
(Chan et al., 2008; McDonald, 2013), as outlined in Figure 1.
Cold executive functions are associated with the dorsolateral
pre-frontal cortical regions and include planning, cognitive
flexibility, working memory, behavioral monitoring, and
inhibition (Chan et al., 2008). While there is an extensive
body of evidence indicating that individuals with ASD are
typically impaired on tests of cold executive functions (Hill,
2004; Ozonoff et al., 2004; Boucher et al., 2005; Rajendran et al.,
2005), the findings are mixed in terms of the specific profile of
executive dysfunction. For example, deficits in working memory
were reported in a number of studies (e.g., Bennetto et al.,
1996; Williams et al., 2005; Steele et al., 2007), whereas other
studies found little evidence of working memory impairments
(Ozonoff and Strayer, 2001; Koshino et al., 2005). Further, there
is conflicting evidence regarding impairments in set-shifting or
mental flexibility (Diamond and Kirkham, 2005), with deficits
reported in one study (Baez et al., 2012), but not in other studies
(Kleinhans et al., 2005; Hill and Bird, 2006). There have also been
mixed findings for response initiation and suppression, with
impairments evident in some studies (Boucher et al., 2005; Hill
and Bird, 2006; Johnston et al., 2011) but not others (Abell and
Hare, 2005; Baez et al., 2012).
Hot executive functions are mediated by the ventromedial
and orbito-frontal cortices, which support behaviors that require
emotional awareness and regulation, empathy, and ToM (Chan
et al., 2008; McDonald, 2013). Conceptualized as a component
of hot executive functions, social cognition is a broad term that
encompasses several domains, including: emotion recognition,
ToM, central coherence, and empathy (Baez et al., 2012; Baez
and Ibanez, 2014).McDonald (2013) distinguished between “hot”
and “cold” aspects of social cognition involved in evaluating and
interpreting a social situation (see Figure 1). Hot social cognition
refers to the processes responsible for emotion perception and
identification, such as empathizing with the affective state of
another person (e.g., emotional empathy). Cold social cognition
involves a more objective perspective, such as thinking about
things from another person’s point of view (e.g., ToM and
cognitive empathy). Essentially, social cognition is a complex
set of processes subserving adaptive social interactions, allowing
an individual to share cognitive and affective experiences of
other people, predict their behavior and communicate effectively
(McDonald, 2013). As such, social cognition is recognized as a
core domain of impairment for individuals with ASD (Happé
et al., 2006; Rajendran andMitchell, 2007). However, the extent to
which social cognition deficits overlap with, or are independent
of cold executive function deficits remains unclear.
More generally, there is debate on whether social cognition
represents a set of general cognitive abilities applied to social
stimuli, or is supported by a dedicated modular cognitive system
(Adolphs, 2010). Support for the functional modularity of social
cognition is evident from some research on developmental
disorders. For example, many high-functioning individuals with
ASD demonstrate impairments in social cognition while general
intellectual ability is preserved (Boucher et al., 2005). Conversely,
individuals with Williams syndrome present with hyper-social
behaviors despite impairments in non-social cognitive domains
(Adolphs, 1999; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005). Further,
neuroimaging research by Castelli et al. (2002) identified
that adults with ASD show reduced activation in a network
of structures implicated in the attribution of mental states.
Although general cognitive abilities (e.g., attention, memory,
and language) and cold executive functions most likely play
an important role during social interaction, the evaluation
and interpretation of emotional and mental states appear
to engage unique processes with specific neural substrates
(Lieberman, 2007). To investigate whether social cognition
operates independently of cold executive functions, reliable, and
valid measures of hot executive functions are needed.
Most studies of social cognition in adults with ASD have
not distinguished between cold and hot ToM (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2003; Uljarevic and Hamilton, 2013). Furthermore, first
and second order false belief tasks (Perner and Wimmer, 1985;
Perner et al., 1989), such as the Faux Pas Test (Stone et al.,
1998) and the Strange Stories Test (Happé, 1994) are text-based
and do not closely resemble the demands of everyday social
interactions (Mathersul et al., 2013). There is mixed evidence of
impairments on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET;
Baron-Cohen et al., 1997, 2001; Couture et al., 2010; Baez et al.,
2012). The RMET is a static measure of ToM that can be solved
using basic and general matching strategies to correctly pair
depicted eyes and emotions. Although the RMET has been used
extensively to assess ToM in people with ASD, the test’s ecological
validity has been questioned (Jarrold et al., 2000; Johnston et al.,
2008).
McDonald et al. (2003, 2006) developed The Awareness
of Social Inference Test (TASIT), a dynamic audio-visual
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FIGURE 1 | Framework of executive function processes, adapted from Chan et al. (2008) and McDonald (2013).
assessment, to more closely approximate the social cognition
skills required during social interaction. TASIT assesses basic
emotion recognition (TASIT Part 1) and cognitive and affective
ToM (Parts 2 and 3; TASIT; McDonald et al., 2003). Mathersul
et al. (2013) used TASIT Parts 2 and 3 to compare the social
cognition performance of adults with ASD to matched controls.
Individuals with ASD were found to demonstrate impairments
in understanding the beliefs, intentions and meaning of
non-literal expressions (i.e., lies and/or sarcasm) relative to
controls. However, their ability to accurately interpret social
interactions that involved a sincere exchange was consistent with
controls.
Performance on social cognition measures such as TASIT
is likely to be influenced by both hot and cold executive
functions (McDonald et al., 2006). Yet, Baez et al. (2012) found
that after controlling for cognitive flexibility (i.e., Switching
Design Fluency), adults with ASD performed more poorly
than controls on the emotion recognition test of TASIT
(Part 1; McDonald et al., 2003), and emotional and cognitive
inference aspects of ToM (FPT). Therefore, deficits in cognitive
flexibility could not account for the impaired performance of
the ASD group on tests of hot executive function relative
to controls. To interpret dynamic social interactions, multiple
sources of information need to be held online (i.e., working
memory) whilst integrating relevant cues (e.g., facial expression,
body language, linguistic content, and context) in order to
understand the meaning of the interaction and provide an
appropriate and timely response. Accordingly, deficits in working
memory and response initiation and suppression potentially
contribute to social cognition impairments for individuals with
ASD, although this has yet to be investigated. Such research
would advance understanding of the higher-order cognitive
deficits underlying difficulties with social interaction for this
population.
The broad objective of the present study was to determine
the independence of deficits in hot executive function and cold
executive function for high-functioning adults with ASD. Due
to their relevance to dynamic social cognition tasks, the cold
executive function domains of focus were working memory and
response initiation and suppression. The first study aim was to
investigate impairments in hot and cold executive functions in
high-functioning adults with ASD relative to matched controls.
It was hypothesized that individuals with ASD would perform
more poorly than controls on tests of cold and hot executive
functions. Further, we sought to determine whether differences
in hot executive function (TASIT) between participants with ASD
and controls were significant after controlling for cold executive
functions (i.e., working memory and response initiation and
suppression).
METHODOLOGY
Design
Control participants were matched to high-functioning
individuals with ASD on the basis of gender, age, and years of
education. Based on studies of executive functions in the adult
ASD population (Hill and Bird, 2006; Baez et al., 2012; Mathersul
et al., 2013), which demonstrated medium to large effect sizes
(control group comparisons), the sample size requirement
was determined using G∗Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2009).
With power of 0.80 and alpha set at 0.05 (one-tailed), power
analyses indicated that a sample of approximately 40 participants
per group was required to detect significant between group
differences.
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Participants
The broader sample consisted of 42 high-functioning adults
with ASD and 40 matched controls. Participants with ASD were
recruited via convenience sampling from ASD support services
and clinics within a major metropolitan area. The directors
and staff were initially contacted regarding the study and they
circulated advertisements for the study in person and through
online forums. The principal investigator (DZ) additionally
presented an overview of the study at several ASD support group
meetings.
All participants were screened to determine eligibility for
participation, meeting the following criteria: (1) formal diagnosis
of ASD and/or self-reported history of longstanding difficulties
in social interaction and communication and a restricted range
of behaviors and/or interests as reflected by scores equal to
or greater than 77 on the Ritvo Autism Asperger’s Diagnostic
Scale—Revised (RAADS; Ritvo et al., 2011); (2) aged 18–70 years;
(3) adequate understanding of spoken and written English; (4)
not currently experiencing a comorbid psychotic disorder; (5)
no history of a serious neurological or medical condition (e.g.,
traumatic brain injury); and (6) absence of suspected literacy
difficulties on a validated reading test. Further, all participants
were administered a test of non-verbal IQ (Matrix Reasoning) to
determine whether their estimated IQ was in the normal range
(i.e., ≥ 70). This is in line with previous ASD research that
has used IQ scores ≥= 70 to indicate high-functioning status
(Baron-Cohen, 2000; Howlin, 2003). The mean estimated non-
verbal IQ for the ASD sample was 102.65 (12.65), with scores
ranging from 75 to 131; thus, all participants were considered to
be high-functioning in terms of their estimated non-verbal IQ.
The control group participants were matched as closely as
possible to the ASD group on gender, age, and years of education.
Control participants were recruited from a university and the
general community. As shown in Table 1, participants in both
groups were predominantly male (ASD group = 64.3%; Control
group = 57.5%), with an average age of 34.02 years for the ASD
sample and 33.23 years for the control sample. Although the
mean years of education were higher in the control group, there
were no significant differences between the groups on any of the
matching variables.
TABLE 1 | Demographic information and ASD symptom severity for the ASD and matched control groups.
Demographic data N/Mean (SD/%), range
ASD group (n = 42) Control group (n = 40) t/χ2 p
Age (years) 34.02 (12.42), 18–66 33.23 (12.41), 18–62 – NS
GENDER
Male 27 (64.3%) 23 (57.5%) – NS
Female 15 (35.7%) 17 (42.5%) – NS
Years of education 14.05 (2.24) 15.18 (2.92) – NS
ETHNICITY
European/Caucasian 40 (95.2%) 30 (75%)
Asian – 10 (25%)
A/TSIa 2 (4.8%) –
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Employedb 21 (50%) 27 (67.5%)
Student 7 (16.6%) 11 (27.5%)
Volunteer 2 (4.8%) 1 (2.5%)
Unemployed 12 (28.6%) 1 (2.5%)
FRIENDSHIP STATUS
1 > close friends 19 (45.2%) 40 (100%)
1 > friends, not close 9 (21.4%) –
Group friends only 6 (14.3%) –
No close friends 8 (19.1%) –
RELATIONSHIP STATUS
Married/De facto 18 (42.9%) 29 (72.5%)
single 24 (57.1%) 11 (27.5%)
RAADS-R scorec 139.05 (36.15), 79–208 37.05 (12.10), 10–58 17.07 p < 0.001
ASD formal diagnosis 31 (73.8%) N/A
Matrix reasoning 102.38 (12.65), 75–131 N/A
WIAT reading subtestd 107.64 (9.81), 78–119 N/A
NS, Not significant.
aA/TSI, Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander.
bEmployed or Self-Employed.
cRAADS-R, Ritvo Autism Asperger Diagnostic Scale-Revised.
dWIAT, Wechsler Individual Achievement Test.
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TABLE 2 | Descriptive statistics for current mental health and adaptive functioning for the ASD group (n = 42).
Test Mean (SD)/Range/Frequency (%) Frequency (%)
Normal Mild/Moderate Severe/Extremely severe
MENTAL HEALTH
DASS—Depression 8.86 (9.05), 0–28 19 (45%) 6 (14%) 17 (41%)
DASS—Anxiety 5.10 (5.83), 0–24 18 (43%) 12 (28.5%) 12 (28.5%)
DASS—Stress 8.57 (7.41), 0–30 20 (47.5%) 10 (24%) 12 (28.5%)
ADAPTIVE FUNCTIONING
Very good 9 (21.4%) – – –
Good 17 (40.5%) – – –
Fair/Poor 16 (38.1%) – – –
Very Poor –
DASS, Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales.
As shown in Table 1, most participants in both groups
identified as European/Caucasian. Approximately 67% of
individuals in the ASD group were employed or in higher
education, as compared to 95% of control participants. In terms
of friendship status, 100% of the control group identified having
one or more close friends compared to 45.2% of individuals
in the ASD group. A higher proportion of individuals in the
control group (72.5%) were in a relationship compared to those
with ASD (42.9%). All 42 participants identified a history of
longstanding ASD symptomatology according to Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Text Revision (DSM-IV-
TR) criteria, with scores on the RAADS-R equal to or greater
than the established clinical cut-off (i.e., ≥77; range: 79–205)
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Ritvo et al., 2011).
Seventy-four percent also reported a prior formal diagnosis of
either ASD or Asperger’s syndrome. There was no evidence of
clinically significant literacy difficulties for the ASD sample, with
a mean scaled score of 107.64 (12.65), and scores ranging from
78 to 119 on a standardized reading test (see Materials).
Data on adaptive functioning and psychological status (see
Materials) were collected as part of a broader research project
focusing on psychosocial outcomes of adults with ASD. In terms
of adaptive functioning (Table 2), most participants with ASD
were classified as having Good (40.5%) or Fair/Poor (38.1%)
functioning, whereas 21.4% were classified as having Very Good
functioning. There were no individuals classified as having
Very Poor adaptive functioning. A measure of self-reported
psychological status (see Materials) indicated that approximately
half of the sample (i.e., 43–48%) were in the normal range for
depression, anxiety and stress. However, severe or extremely
severe mood symptoms were reported by 41% of the sample for
depression and 29% for both anxiety and stress.
Materials
Screening Assessments
Ritvo Autism Asperger’s diagnostic scale—revised (RAADS;
Ritvo et al., 2011)
The RAADS-R is a self-report measure based on the DSM-IV-
TR and International classification of diseases: Tenth revision
(ICD-10 criteria) which is used to assist in the diagnosis of adults
with ASD. The scale consists of 80-items (i.e., 64 symptom and
16 non-symptom based responses). Each question is rated on
a 4-point Likert scale in order of severity ranging from “True
now and when I was young” = 3 to “Never true” = 0. To
minimize response bias, the 16 non-symptom based responses
are reverse scored and are indicated by an asterisk beside each
item. A total score of ≥77 out of a maximum score of 240 is
indicative of an ASD diagnosis (Ritvo et al., 2011). The RAADS-R
has demonstrated excellent test re-test reliability (r = 0.99) and
sensitivity (97–100%) and specificity (100%; Ritvo et al., 2008,
2011).
Matrix reasoning: Wechsler abbreviated scale of intelligence
(WASI; Wechsler, 1999)
The WASI measures estimated verbal and non-verbal
intelligence (i.e., Matrix Reasoning), and can yield a Full
Scale intelligence quotient (IQ). Due to possible language
difficulties impacting estimated IQ, only the Matrix Reasoning
subtest was administered as a measure of estimated non-verbal
IQ to help determine eligibility for those in the ASD group (i.e.,
IQ ≥ 70 based on T-score equivalent of >30).
Wechsler individual achievement test-third edition (WIAT
III;Wechsler, 2009)
The Word Reading subtest of the WIAT was administered as a
screening assessment of literacy difficulties for high-functioning
individuals with ASD. Individuals read from a list of 35 words,
with each correctly pronounced word scored as one point and
converted to a scaled score. In the present study, no participant
with ASD performed in the range indicating suspected literacy
difficulties (i.e., scores <70; Wechsler, 2009).
Depression, anxiety, and stress scales-21 (DASS-21; Lovibond
and Lovibond, 1995)
The DASS-21 comprises three 7-item subscales that assess the
negative emotional states of depression, anxiety and stress and
is based on the original 42-item version. Respondents are asked
to rate the extent to which each item applied to them over
the past week on a 4-point Likert scale, whereby higher scores
indicate greater emotional distress. Scores on each 7-item scale
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 February 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 24
Zimmerman et al. Executive Function Deficits in Autism
are doubled to enable the following clinical cut-offs to be applied:
Depression 0–8 (normal), 9–13 (mild), 14–22 (moderate), 24–36
(severe), and >36 (very severe); Anxiety 0–5 (normal), 6–8
(mild), 9–15 (moderate), 16–26 (severe), and >26 (very severe);
Stress 0–14 (normal), 15–18 (mild), 19–26 (moderate), 27–37
(severe), and >37 (very severe; Lovibond and Lovibond, 1995).
The DASS was used in the present study to provide descriptive
information on the current mental health status for the ASD
group.
Adaptive functioning
For descriptive purposes for the ASD sample, a composite
measure of overall adaptive functioning was derived from key
demographic information (i.e., employment, relationship status,
independence, and friendships), with low scores indicating better
outcomes. Outcome ratings were determined using a scale
adapted from Howlin et al. (2004) and Lotter (1978): Very Good
= employed/studying, one or more close friends, high level
of independence, in a relationship (total scores 0–2); Good =
working or studying in some capacity; requiring some degree of
support in daily living; some friends/acquaintances (total scores
3–5); Fair/Poor = has some degree of independence; requiring
special residential provision/high level of support; no friends
outside of residence; voluntary work (total scores 6–11); Very
Poor = needing high-level hospital based or institutional care;
no friends; no autonomy or independence (total score ≥11).
Measures of Cold Executive Functions
Hayling sentence completion test (Hayling; Burgess and
Shallice, 1997)
The Hayling Test is designed to assess problems with response
initiation and suppression. In the first part, the test administrator
reads aloud 15 incomplete sentences that the respondent is
required to complete with a word that would make the sentence
meaningful. The second part is comprised of an additional 15
incomplete sentences that the individual needs to complete with
a word that does not fit the context. Four scores are obtained:
time taken for part one and two (response initiation [Box A and
Box B]), errors for part two (response suppression and concept
formation [Box C]) and an overall score (total of Box A, B, and
C scores). All response latency and error scores are converted to
scaled scores that range from 1 (impaired) to 10 (very superior),
with a score of 6 indicating average ability. Burgess and Shallice
(1997) report test-retest reliability coefficients ranging from r =
0.52 (total errors) to r = 0.78 (Part 2, time) over an interval of 2
days to 4 weeks. The Hayling Test has good convergent validity
with othermeasures of response inhibition (e.g., Stroop Inference
Test and Color Trails Test; Stroop, 1935; D’Elia et al., 1996) and
is sensitive to executive impairment in ASD (Boucher et al., 2005;
Hill and Bird, 2006).
Letter number sequencing (LNS; Wechsler, 2008)
LNS is a subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Fourth
Edition (WAIS-IV) designed to assess working memory. During
this test, the examiner reads a string of numbers and letters
(e.g., C-5-A-1) of increasing length across trials. Test-takers are
required to say numbers first in ascending order and letters
second in alphabetical order (e.g., 1-5-A-C). Correct responses
for each item are totalled across trials and range from 0 to 30
with lower scores indicating poorer working memory. Scaled
scores are derived using aged-based normative data (Wechsler,
2008). Studies have reported adequate test-retest reliability (r =
0.75) for the LNS and good ecological validity in the context of
predicting functional status in a clinical population (Nuechterlein
et al., 2008).
Measures of Hot Executive Functions
The awareness of social-inference test-revised (TASIT;
McDonald et al., 2006)
TASIT is a dynamic audio-visual based assessment of social
cognition. Comprised of a series of 15–60 second video vignettes,
TASIT requires participants to implicitly encode and integrate
contextual information to understand the social situation in
three conditions: (1) Emotion Evaluation; (2) Social Inference–
Minimal (SI-M); and (3) Social Inference–Enriched (SI-E).
TASIT 2 and 3 assess simple and complex ToM judgments
(Mathersul et al., 2013). For emotion evaluation (part 1), there
are 28 scenes for which the respondent is required to identify
an actor’s emotional state by choosing from one of six basic
emotions: happy, sad, angry, anxious, surprised, and revolted.
When the actor is not exhibiting any particular emotion, the
participant is advised to select a neutral response. Each correct
response is allocated one point and then summed for a total score,
ranging from 0 to 28. In addition, the seven response options
can be classified into either positive (i.e., happy, surprised, and
neutral) or negative (i.e., sad, angry, anxious, and revolted)
emotions (Flanagan et al., 2002).
In Part 2, the SI-M subtest assesses the ability to determine
the meaning and intention of a speaker’s dialogue, emotional
expression and other paralinguistic cues with minimal context.
Comprised of 15 short video scenes of social interactions, the
participant responds to four separate questions related to what
they think the key actor was doing, saying, thinking, and feeling
toward another person. The respondent answers in three possible
ways: yes, no or don’t know. There are five scenes in which
the actors are sincere (i.e., the actors thoughts and feelings are
congruent with the words they use), five scenes in which the
actors are sarcastic using paralinguistic cues (e.g., tone of voice)
and fives scenes in which paradoxical sarcasm is utilized. Each
correct response is allocated one point and then summed for the
question type (i.e., do, say, think, and feel) to yield a total score
ranging from 0 to 60.
Part 3 (SI-E) incorporates the same response format as SI-
M, but examines an individual’s ability to understand social
inferences within an enriched context. For the 16 scenes, half the
videos depict an actor telling a lie while the remaining scenes
involve sarcasm. In addition, eight scenes use either a visual or
verbal cue to reveal the true state of affairs or the true beliefs of the
speaker. Each correct response is allocated one point and scores
are summed for the question type (i.e., do, say, think, and feel)
and the number of items to calculate a total score ranging from 0
to 64. TASIT 3 is proposed to assess second-order or advanced
ToM, whereby the respondent must infer the thoughts of one
actor toward another actor (Baron-Cohen, 1995).
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TASIT has been widely validated as a measure of social
cognition in different clinical populations, including traumatic
brain injury (McDonald et al., 2003; McDonald and Flanagan,
2004; McDonald and Saunders, 2005), schizophrenia (Kern et al.,
2009; Sparks et al., 2010; Chung et al., 2011) and dementia
(Kipps et al., 2009). It has also demonstrated validity as a
measure of social cognition for high-functioning adults with
ASD (Mathersul et al., 2013). TASIT has sound psychometric
properties with good test-retest reliability over a period of 5–26
weeks (r = 0.74 − 0.88) and evidence of convergent and
discriminant validity (McDonald et al., 2006; McDonald, 2012).
Procedure
Ethical clearance was granted by the Griffith University
Human Research Ethics Committee (protocol number
PSY/28/13/HREC) and the study was conducted in accordance
with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human
Research. The assessment process was conducted over two
phases: (1) demographic survey and the RAADS-R were
completed online via a web-link based survey emailed to
individuals; and (2) face-to-face administration of a cognitive
test battery. Participants in the ASD group received a $20 gift
voucher for their participation. The control group participants
were recruited via the researchers’ social networks and the
Griffith University psychology subject pool whereby individuals
received course credit for their participation.
In the first assessment phase, participants provided their
informed consent followed by questions relating to their
demographic and social functioning status using LimeSurvey, a
free open source software tool (Schmitz, 2015). For the face-to-
face assessment, the Hayling Sentence Completion Test, LNS,
and TASIT were administered in a quiet room. To ensure that
results from the cognitive test battery were not confounded by
order effects (Shum et al., 2006), each test was assigned a number
and the sequence was randomized to determine the order of
administration for each participant.
Data Analysis
The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version
22 for Windows was utilized for all analyses and data
screening procedures were conducted according to guidelines
by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). Data were examined for
entry errors and missing values. The descriptive data revealed
plausible ranges, means and standard deviations for all
variables. Neuropsychological performance was classified into
the categories of Normal performance and Mild/Moderate (i.e.,
≥ −1 SD) and Severe (i.e., ≥ −2 SD) impairment based on the
normative data for each test.
Frequency analysis revealed no missing data for the ASD
and control group. As it was intended to conduct analyses on
group data, univariate outliers, and assumptions of normality
were examined separately for the control and ASD groups.
Examination of total scores revealed a violation of normality
for TASIT 2. This was successfully transformed to correct the
negatively skewed data. There were no univariate outliers in
the total scores of executive function measures. Inspection of
subscales within TASIT 1–3 and Hayling revealed numerous
violations of normality and univariate outliers (i.e., z > ± 3.29)
for which transformations were unable to correct (note: this
was the case for subscales but not total scores). Thus, non-
parametric tests (Mann Whitney U-tests) were conducted to
test the hypothesis regarding differences between the ASD and
control groups on measures of executive function. Holm’s (1979)
step-down procedure was employed to control the Familywise
error rate. This method involves ordering p values from lowest
to highest and cumulatively adding each value until 0.05 is
reached. The null hypothesis is rejected for all values less than
the cumulative 0.05 total (Holland and Copenhaver, 1988; Aickin
and Gensler, 1996).
Three sets of hierarchical multiple regression analyses were
conducted with TASIT 1–3 total scores as the outcome
variables to determine whether between-group differences in
social cognition were significant after controlling for potential
covariates and cold executive functions. There were no significant
associations between TASIT performance and age, gender and
education. However, independent t-tests revealed significant
between group differences on TASIT 1 and 2 total scores
according to employment status (dummy coded). Employment
status (for TASIT 1 and 2 only) and scores on Hayling and LNS
and were entered in the first step of the regression and ASD status
(dummy coded) was entered in the second step. There were no
violations of multivariate assumptions for these variables.
RESULTS
Comparison of ASD and Control Groups on
Measures of Executive Functioning
Descriptive statistics were generated for TASIT parts 1–3, LNS
and Hayling (see Table 3). Based on TASIT norms, the majority
of participants (i.e., >50%) in the control and ASD groups were
in the normal range for emotion evaluation (Part 1), social
inference-minimal (Part 2), and social inference-enriched (Part
3). However, a greater proportion of participants in the ASD
group (38–45%) was classified as having either mild/moderate or
severe impairment than the control group (0–7.5%) on all parts
of TASIT (see Table 3).
As shown in Table 3, significant between group differences
were evident on most TASIT subscales and LNS and Hayling
scores. The medians indicated that the control group consistently
outperformed the ASD group on these measures. Effect sizes
(r) were manually calculated using z scores as recommended by
Pallant (2013). According to Cohen’s (1988) criteria, effect sizes
ranged from small to large (r = 0.26− 0.60).
For TASIT Part 1, the seven response options are classified
into either positive (i.e., happy, surprised and neutral) or negative
(i.e., sad, angry, anxious, and revolted) emotions. Mann-Whitney
U tests revealed a significant overall difference in the ability to
identify positive emotions between the ASD group (Md = 10)
and the control group (Md = 11), U = 382.5, z = −4.38,
p < 0.001, r = 0.48). In addition, there was a significant overall
difference in detecting negative emotions between the ASD group
(Md = 13) and the control group (Md = 15), U = 299, z
= −5.15, p < 0.001, r = 0.60). The medians suggested that
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TABLE 3 | Executive function performance and classification of impairment for the ASD and control groups.
Test Scoring Median/n (%)
ASD (n = 42) Controls (n = 40) U/z (Effect size)
TASIT
EE (part 1) Raw scores 23 26 257.5/-5.46 (0.60)*b
Normal Normative 25 (59.5%) 40 (100%)
Mild/Moderate descriptionsa 10 (23.8%) –
Severe 7 (16.7%) –
Happy Raw scores 3 4 547/−3.09 (0.34)*
Surprised 4 4 612.5/−2.77 (0.31)*
Neutral 3 3 581.5/−2.65 (0.29)*
Sad 3 4 637/−2.15 (0.24)*
Angry 3 4 402.5/−4.62 (0.51)*
Anxious 4 4 654/−2.04
Revolted 4 4 693)/1.79
SI-M (part 2) Raw scores 50 (319) 56 −4.84 (0.53)*
Normal Normative 23 (54.8%) 37 (92.5%)
Mild/Moderate descriptions 7 (16.7%) 3 (7.5%)
Severe 12 (28.6%) –
Do Raw scores 13 14 441.5/−3.83 (0.42)*
Say 12.5 14 365/−4.53 (0.50)*
Think 12 14 385/−4.28 (0.47)*
Feel 13 14 336.5/−4.80 (0.53)*
SI-E (part 3) Raw scores 52 58 337.5/−4.67 (0.52)*
Normal Normative 26 (61.9%) 37 (92.5%)
Mild/Moderate description 6 (14.3%) 3 (7.5%)
Severe 10 (23.8%) –
Do Raw scores 14 14 636.5/−1.93
Say 13 14 573.5/−2.51 (0.28)*
Think 13 14 728/−1.07
Feel 13 13.5 577.5/−2.49 (0.27)*
LNS Scaled scores 10 11 526/−2.95 (0.33)*
Hayling Scaled scores
Box A 5 6 460/−3.83 (0.42)*
Box B 6 6 446/−4.38 (0.48)*
Box C 7 7 601.5/−2.33 (0.26)*
Total Scorec 17 19 365.5/−4.48 (0.49)*
*p < 0.05; EE, Emotion Evaluation; LNS, Letter Number Sequencing; SI-M, Social Inference-Minimal; SI-E, Social Inference-Enriched; TASIT, The Awareness of Social Inference Test.
aClassification relative to TASIT norms: Mild/Moderate ≥ −1 SD to < −2 SD; Severe ≥ −2 SD.
b Significance values adjusted using Holm’s procedure.
cTotal Scaled Scores from Box A, B, and C.
the control group were significantly better at identifying both
positive and negative emotions than the ASD group.
For TASIT Part 2, vignettes are categorized according to
whether the social interaction was sincere or involved simple
sarcasm or paradoxical sarcasm. Mann-Whitney U tests revealed
a significant difference in the ability to interpret sincere
interactions between the ASD group (Md = 16) and control
group (Md = 19), U = 541.5, z = −2.80, p = 0.005, r = 0.31).
There was also a significant difference in the ability to detect
simple sarcasm between the ASD group (Md = 16.5) and control
group (Md = 20), U = 365, z = −4.55, p < 0.001, r = 0.50).
Finally, there was a significant difference in the ability to identify
paradoxical sarcasm between the ASD group (Md = 18.5) and
control group (Md = 20), U = 556.5, z = −2.77, p = 0.006,
r = 0.31). The median scores indicated that the controls were
significantly more accurate than participants with ASD group in
making social inferences with minimal context.
For TASIT Part 3, vignettes related to situations involving
either lies or sarcasm. Mann-Whitney U tests revealed a
significant difference in the ability to understand social inferences
involving lies between the ASD group (Md = 26) and control
group (Md = 29), U = 459.5, z = −3.55, p < 0.001, r = 0.39).
Further, there was a significant difference in the ability to detect
sarcasm between the ASD group (Md = 26) and control group
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TABLE 4 | Means, standard deviations and correlations between TASIT part 1–3, Hayling and LNS (n = 82).
Mean SD TASIT Part 2 TASIT Part 3 Hayling LNS
TASIT Part 1 24.49 2.21 0.51** 0.49** 0.48** 0.34*
TASIT Part 2 52.20 6.29 0.69** 0.47** 0.25*
TASIT Part 3 54.22 6.73 0.42** 0.29*
Haylinga 17.37 3.22 0.23*
LNSb 10.63 2.82
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
aTotal scaled scores from Box A, B, and C.
bLetter Number Sequencing scaled score; TASIT, The Awareness of Social Inference Test.
TABLE 5 | Hierarchical multiple regression analysis of the relationship between ASD status and TASIT part 1 (emotion evaluation) controlling for Hayling,
LNS and employment status (n = 82).
Variable B β sr2 p 95% CI
Constant 17.55 [14.93, 20.17]
STEP 1
Hayling 0.28 0.39 0.13 <0.001*** [0.14, 0.42]
LNS 0.20 0.24 0.05 0.012* [0.05, 0.36]
Employmenta −1.3 −0.21 0.04 0.024* [−2.47, −0.18]
STEP 2
Hayling 0.18 0.25 0.04 0.013** [0.04, 0.32]
LNS 0.15 0.19 0.03 0.04* [0.01, 0.30]
Employment −0.76 −0.12 0.02 0.17 [−1.87, 0.34]
ASD statusb 1.80 0.37 0.09 0.001*** [0.81, 2.80]
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
aEmployment: 1, Employed/Student; 2, Unemployed.
bASD status: 1, ASD; 2, Control.
(Md = 29), U = 404.5, z = −4.06, p < 0.001, r = 0.45). The
median scores indicated that the control group demonstrated
a greater ability to make social inferences in situations with
enriched information than participants with ASD.
Given the generalized pattern of impairment across hot and
cold executive functions demonstrated by the ASD group relative
to controls, it was relevant to examine whether the between-
group differences in hot executive function were significant
after controlling for performance on tests of cold executive
function.
Independence of Impairments in Hot and
Cold Executive Functions
Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics and correlations for
TASIT, LNS and Hayling for the combined control and ASD
sample. The measures of executive functioning were significantly
inter-related, with medium to large association (r = 0.42− 0.48)
between TASIT and Hayling, and small to medium associations
between TASIT and LNS (r = 0.25− 0.34).
As shown in Table 5, Hayling, LNS and employment status
initially explained 36.8% of the variance in TASIT Part 1
[F(3, 78) = 15.11, p < 0.001]. When ASD status was entered
in Step 2, the total variance explained significantly increased to
46.3%, F(4, 77) = 16.34, p < 0.001 (adjusted R
2 = 0.43). ASD
status explained an additional 9.2% of the variance in TASIT
Part 1 scores, F change(1, 77) = 13.03, p < 0.01. In the final
model, ASD status (sr2 = 0.09), Hayling (sr2 = 0.04) and LNS
(sr2 = 0.03) were all significant predictors. Therefore, the ASD
group demonstrated deficits in emotional evaluation relative to
controls that were independent of impairments in cold executive
function and employment status.
For TASIT 2 (see Table 6), Hayling, LNS and employment
status initially explained 25.7% of the variance in performance
[F(3, 78) = 9.00, p < 0.001). When ASD status was entered
in Step 2, the total variance explained increased significantly
to 34.6%, F(4, 77) = 8.89, p < 0.001 (adjusted R
2 = 0.31).
ASD status explained an additional 8.9% of the variance in
TASIT Part 2 scores, F change(1, 77) = 10.43, p = 0.002. In
the final model, only Hayling (sr2 = 0.04) and ASD status
(sr2 = 0.09) were significant predictors. Thus, individuals with
ASD demonstrated deficits in making social inferences with
minimal context relative to controls that were independent of
impairments in cold executive function and employment status.
As presented in Table 7, Hayling and LNS initially explained
24.7% of the variance in TASIT Part 3 performance [F(2, 79) =
12.93, p < 0.001]. When ASD status was entered in Step 2,
the total variance explained significantly increased to 33.6%,
F(3, 78) = 13.15, p < 0.001 (adjusted R
2 = 0.31). ASD status
explained an additional 8.9% of the variance in TASIT Part 3
scores (1, 78) = 10.47, p = 0.002. In the final model, only
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TABLE 6 | Hierarchical multiple regression analysis of the relationships between ASD status and TASIT part 2 (social inference-minimal) controlling for
Hayling, LNS and employment status (n = 82).
Variable B β sr² p 95% CI
Constant −5.66 [−6.95, −4.36]
STEP 1
Hayling 0.125 0.38 0.13 <0.001*** [0.06, 0.19]
LNS 0.07 0.18 0.02 0.09 [−0.01, 0.15]
Employmenta −0.36 −0.13 0.01 0.21 [−0.92, 0.21]
STEP 2
Hayling 0.08 0.24 0.04 0.029* [0.01, 0.15]
LNS 0.05 0.12 0.01 0.23 [−0.03, 0.12]
Employment −0.10 −0.04 0.001 0.71 [−0.66, 0.45]
ASD statusb 0.81 0.36 0.09 0.002** [0.31, 1.31]
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
aEmployment: 1, Employed/Student; 2, Unemployed.
bASD status: 1, ASD; 2, Control.
TABLE 7 | Hierarchical multiple regression analysis of the relationship between ASD status and TASIT part 3 (social inference-enriched) controlling for
the Hayling and LNS (n = 82).
Variable B β sr² p 95% CI
Constant −4.22 [−6.13, −2.32]
STEP 1
Hayling 1.50 0.33 0.09 0.002** [0.56, 2.43]
LNS 0.65 0.28 0.07 0.010** [0.16, 1.13]
STEP 2
Hayling 0.77 0.17 0.02 0.13 [−0.22, 1.76]
LNS 0.51 0.22 0.04 0.03* [0.042, 0.98]
ASD statusa 0.73 0.35 0.09 0.002** [0.28, 1.17]
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
aASD status: 1, ASD; 2, Control.
LNS (sr2 = 0.04) and ASD (sr2 = 0.09) were significant
predictors. Therefore, consistent with TASIT Parts 1 and 2, the
ASD group demonstrated deficits in making social inferences
with enriched context relative to controls that were independent
of impairments in cold executive function.
DISCUSSION
The broad aim of this study was to investigate the profile
of hot and cold executive function impairments in high-
functioning adults with ASD relative to matched controls.
Overall, the ASD group demonstrated general impairments in
hot and cold executive functions (i.e., emotion recognition,
ToM, working memory and response initiation and suppression)
when compared to matched controls. Further, the impairments
in emotion recognition and ToM demonstrated by ASD
participants were independent of deficits in workingmemory and
response initiation and suppression. The pattern of findings and
the theoretical and clinical implications will now be discussed.
Consistent with previous research, high-functioning
individuals with ASD demonstrated deficits in working memory
(Bennetto et al., 1996; Williams et al., 2005; Steele et al., 2007),
response initiation and suppression (Boucher et al., 2005; Hill
and Bird, 2006; Johnston et al., 2011) and multiple components
of social cognition (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003; Goldenfeld et al.,
2005; Auyeung et al., 2009; Baez et al., 2012; Mathersul et al.,
2013). However, in contrast to the findings of Baez et al. (2012),
participants with ASD in the present study were significantly
poorer at recognizing emotions on TASIT Part 1 than matched
controls. A likely explanation for these contrasting findings for
emotion recognition relates to statistical power; namely, the
sample size (n = 42) was larger in the present study than the
study by Baez et al. (n = 15).
Further, analyses on TASIT Part 1 revealed that participants
with ASD were significantly poorer at identifying both positive
and negative emotions than controls. Interestingly, there were
no significant between group differences in accuracy for the
emotions of anxiety and revolted. Although there are few
previous studies examining recognition of different emotions in
high-functioning adults with ASD, a meta-analysis by Uljarevic
and Hamilton (2013) investigated emotion recognition in 48
studies with ASD samples spanning a broad age range (note:
there were no significant effects of age or IQ on emotion
recognition performance). Overall, the meta-analysis yielded
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a large effect size which indicated a general impairment in
emotion recognition. However, they found that the ability to
recognize happiness was only marginally impaired, whereas
impairments in fear recognition were more marked than
happiness. One potential explanation for the inconsistency
between these findings and that of the present study is that
most studies included in the meta-analysis employed tasks
involving static faces rather than dynamic stimuli. Further, in
most studies reviewed in themeta-analysis, happiness was treated
as a “baseline” emotion for comparison of impairment between
different emotions (Uljarevic and Hamilton, 2013). Overall, the
present findings support the view that high-functioning adults
with ASD experience a more generalized impairment in the
recognition of positive and negative emotions. However, they
may find some emotions more difficult to recognize (e.g., neutral
expressions) than others (e.g., revolted) in dynamic displays.
The overall finding that high-functioning individuals with
ASD were significantly poorer at making social inferences than
controls is in line with previous research (Perner and Wimmer,
1985; Perner et al., 1989; Happé, 1994; Baron-Cohen et al.,
1997, 2003; Stone et al., 1998; Goldenfeld et al., 2005; Auyeung
et al., 2009; Mathersul et al., 2013). These results add further
support to the idea that contextual insensitivity (i.e., appraising
critical information as unimportant while ignoring essential
contextual stimuli) is a key mechanism underpinning deficits
in social cognition for high-functioning individuals with ASD
(Baez and Ibanez, 2014; Vermeulen, 2015). However, in contrast
to Mathersul et al. (2013), who did not find a between group
difference for sincere exchanges (i.e., SI-M or simple ToM
judgements), the present study identified that participants with
ASD were significantly poorer at perceiving sincere interactions.
One potential explanation relates to the lower mean RAADS-
R score (i.e., 126.4) for the sample in the study of Mathersul
et al. (2013) when compared to the present sample (i.e., 137.88).
Thus, more severe ASD symptoms may have contributed to the
poorer performance of ASD participants in making simple ToM
judgements about sincere interactions relative to controls.
The finding that ASD participants were impaired at detecting
sarcasm and lies when contextual information is enriched (i.e.,
SI-E or advanced ToM) is consistent with previous research
(Mathersul et al., 2013). However, unlike Mathersul et al. (2013),
significant differences were not observed for the “doing” and
“thinking” probes. A possible explanation for these results relates
to the differential demands placed on executive control processes
between SI-M and SI-E tasks (Castelli et al., 2002; McDonald,
2013). More specifically, to interpret dynamic social interactions,
multiple sources of information need to be held online whilst
integrating relevant cues (e.g., facial expression, body language,
linguistic content, and context) to understand the meaning of the
interaction, and formulate an appropriate and timely response.
When less contextual information was provided (i.e., SI-M), and
there were less demands on working memory, ASD participants
in the current study were significantly poorer at answering all
response probes (i.e., doing, saying, thinking, and feeling) relative
to controls.When contextual information was enriched and there
were greater demands on working memory to support social
inference skills, the performance of ASD participants on the
“doing” and “thinking” probes wasmore consistent with controls.
Therefore, despite overall poorer performance on measures of
social inference, the pattern of impairment across the response
probes may have been influenced by the varying demands on cold
executive function processes between the minimal and enriched
conditions of SI-M and SI-E.
The independence of hot and cold executive functions and
differential contributions of working memory and response
initiation and suppression processes to TASIT performance
was further investigated using regression analyses. Individuals
with ASD demonstrated poorer performance on measures
of emotion recognition and social inference than controls
after controlling for cold executive functions. The findings
also demonstrated that the ability to recognize emotions
and make correct social inferences during dynamic displays
was supported by working memory and response initiation
and suppression processes, irrespective of participants’ ASD
status and employment status. When contextual information
was minimal, better response initiation and suppression skills
supported correct social inferences. Conversely, when contextual
information was enriched, stronger working memory skills
enhanced the ability to make correct social inferences.
Overall, the present results extend upon those of Baez et al.
(2012) and support the distinction between impairments in
cold and hot executive functions for adults with ASD. Further,
consistent with neurophysiological evidence (Bauman, 1996;
McAlonan et al., 2005; Ashwin et al., 2007; Lieberman, 2007),
these findings suggest that hot and cold executive functions are
supported by an integrated neural network. Hence, response
initiation and suppression and working memory processes
support emotion recognition and social inference skills during
dynamic social interaction.
There are several study limitations that are important to
acknowledge. For the ASD group, the convenience sampling
method yielded a male-to-female ratio of approximately 2.8:1
and considerable variability in the age range (18–66 years). It
is broadly accepted that males are more commonly diagnosed
with ASD (i.e., ratio of approximately 4.3:1; (Fombonne, 2003).
There was also a high proportion of individuals in the present
study with elevated levels of self-reported depression, anxiety
and stress symptoms and adaptive functioning was variable for
the sample. More generally, given the convenience sampling
approach and demographic characteristics, the participants in
the present study may not be representative of the broader
ASD population. Further, research is needed to examine the
relationship between hot and cold executive functions, severity of
ASD symptoms and psychosocial outcomes (note: a study with
this objective has recently been completed by the authors and a
manuscript is in preparation).
An additional study limitation was the lack of formal
verification of a current ASD diagnosis from an independent
clinical assessment. The reliance on a past diagnosis and self-
reported symptoms may have misidentified some participants as
having an ASD. Nonetheless, all participants in the ASD group
reported a history of longstanding difficulties in social interaction
and communication, and a restricted range of behaviors and/or
interests on the RAADS-R, which is a validated assessment tool
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to support diagnosis of ASD (Ritvo et al., 2008, 2011). As a
further limitation, the estimate of IQ was based only on Matrix
Reasoning which is a non-verbal test. Although no individuals
with ASD performed in the range indicating literacy difficulties
on a reading test, a measure of verbal reasoning skills may have
provided a more accurate reflection of verbal IQ. Related to
this point, both cold executive function tests required verbal
responses. Thus, it is possible that the poorer performance of
the ASD sample on the cold executive function tests relative
to controls may have been related to lower verbal reasoning
skills.
Finally, only two tests of cold executive functions were selected
for this study based on the perceived relevance of working
memory and response initiation and suppression to dynamic
social cognition tasks. A broader battery of tests of cold executive
function (including switching, planning, reasoning and problem-
solving) is needed to further determine the independence
of impairments in hot and cold executive functioning for
individuals with ASD in future research. The influence of
other cognitive domains (e.g., language, visuo-spatial skills, and
processing speed), adaptive functioning and mental health status
on social cognition deficits also needs to be investigated for this
population.
The present findings improve understanding of the profile of
higher-order cognitive deficits underlying difficulties with social
interaction for high-functioning adults with ASD. Specifically,
the independence of deficits in social cognition and working
memory and response initiation and suppression highlights the
need for comprehensive assessment of hot and cold executive
functions to aid diagnosis and inform interventions. The finding
that working memory and response initiation and suppression
skills contribute to the ability to recognize emotions and make
social inferences suggests the likely value of targeting both hot
and cold executive function impairments in interventions. There
is some empirical support for the efficacy of social cognition
skills training for the ASD population through computer-based
programs or group-based cognitive behavioral interventions
(see review by Bishop-Fitzpatrick et al., 2013). Further, Eack
et al. (2013) demonstrated the feasibility, acceptability and
initial efficacy of Cognitive Enhancement Therapy (Hogarty
and Flesher, 1999), a comprehensive cognitive rehabilitation
program, for treating impairments in “social and non-social
information processing” in adults with ASD. They reported
significant effects for both cognitive deficits (i.e., working
memory, behavioral monitoring and perseverative errors) and
social behavior. Further, research is needed to determine
the efficacy of integrated cognitive rehabilitation and social
cognition interventions that concurrently target cold and hot
executive function deficits. It would be particularly valuable to
determine whether improvements in cold executive function
might positively influence improvements in hot executive
functions or vice versa.
In summary, the present study identified that high-
functioning adults with ASD performed more poorly on
measures of both hot and cold executive functions relative to
controls. Furthermore, their impairments in emotion recognition
and social inference were independent of deficits in working
memory and response initiation and suppression.
The finding highlight the need to assess hot and cold
executive functions in clinical practice and to concurrently target
impairments in both domains in interventions for the ASD
population.
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